FIRST DIVISION
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R TransporT corporation, petitioner, - versus - philhino
sales corporation, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 148150 Present: PANGANIBAN,
C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: July 12, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner R Transport Corporation, seeks to
nullify and set aside the 14 February 2001 Decision[1]
and 9 May 2001 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60026 which affirmed the Orders dated 20
March 2000,[3] 6 April
2000[4]
and 26 June 2000,[5] of the
Honorable Judge Jose R. Hernandez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
158, Pasig City. The Order dated
In September 1994, petitioner, a
domestic corporation, through its President, Rizalina
Lamzon, allegedly purchased from respondent Pilhino Sales Corporation ten brand new units of Hino RF821
buses for P2,235,000.00 per unit. This transaction was covered by a Sales Proposal
Advice wherein respondent approved a payment scheme where the 30% downpayment shall be payable in eight monthly installments
covered by a promissory note and post dated checks or in tax credit financing
as petitioner’s Board of Investments incentives, while the remaining 70% would
be paid through financing.
Pursuant to the sale, the buses were delivered
to petitioner. Notwithstanding delivery
of the units, petitioner allegedly failed to pay the monthly installments of
the 30% downpayment. It also did not remit to
respondent the supposed proceeds of the bank financing for the remaining 70%.
Respondent made several demands on
petitioner to make good its obligation.
The latter made an initial payment of P8,900,000.00
on P22,958,515.77. Despite repeated demands by respondent, no
payments were made thereafter by petitioner on its outstanding obligation.
With petitioner’s alleged failure to
fulfill its obligation, respondent, on
Petitioner submitted its Answer with
counterclaim.
During the preliminary proceedings,
respondent’s Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was granted. Subsequently, upon Motion of the petitioner
and filing of a counterbond, the Writ was dissolved.
After numerous delays spanning more
than two years, the case was finally set for trial on
On
On
2. That defendant’s witness, MS. RIZALINA LAMZON
unexpectedly, has to leave on
It
prayed that the scheduled cross-examinations be cancelled and be transferred to
the following dates:
In a Resolution dated
DENIED
settings made by agreement of parties.
On
While the foregoing Motion was
pending, the trial court issued an Order[12]
dated
For failure of witness Ms. Rizalina
Lam[z]on and defendant’s counsel to appear in today’s hearing despite notice,
as prayed for, the direct testimony of this witness is stricken off the
record. Consequently, defendant is
directed to file its formal offer of evidence within ten (10) days from receipt
of this order copy furnished the plaintiff which is given a similar period of
time from receipt of the offer within which to file its comment/objection to
it, after which, the incident is submitted for resolution.
After defendant shall have rested its case, parties
are given a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of that order to file their
simultaneous memorandum, after which, this case shall be submitted for
decision.
On
This resolves defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Even when plaintiff was
given an opportunity to file its opposition to the motion, none was filed.
The motion is denied, there being no cogent reason
that it should be reconsidered. The
hearings of this case were made by agreement of the parties and whenever there
are postponements, it’s with the consent of all concerned. Everyone then was given his day in Court.
Consequently, the Order of
Aggrieved, petitioner filed before
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Preliminary Injunction
and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order.
Convinced that irreparable injury may
be suffered by petitioner if trial continues and to forestall the mooting of
its judgment on the case, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[15]
dated
In its Memorandum before the Court of
Appeals, petitioner raised the following issues[17]: whether
or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated 6 April 2000 and 26 June 2000; whether
or not the trial court denied petitioner substantial justice; whether or not
the trial court skewed petitioner’s right to due process; and whether or not
the trial court violated the principle of impartiality in handling the case.
Petitioner contended that the trial
court acted arbitrarily and despotically when it issued the order dated
Petitioner added that the striking
off the record of the testimony of Rizalina Lamzon, which testimony is substantially material to its
defense and after she had been extensively cross-examined by respondent’s counsel,
constitutes a grave and irreparable injury to its defense, thereby denying it
substantial justice. In the same vein, petitioner bewailed the trial court’s
directive in the Order dated
Lastly, petitioner ascribed
partiality on the part of the trial court as it purportedly tilted in
respondent’s favor by granting the latter several postponements, whereas it was
too quick to deny petitioner’s supplication for the transfer of the scheduled
dates for its witness’ cross-examination.
In the assailed Decision dated
In sustaining the trial court’s
denial of petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Transfer Dates of Hearing/Trial, the
Court of Appeals ratiocinated that the scheduled hearing on
As to petitioner’s assertion that the
trial court did not resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
The Courts of Appeals acceded further
to the propriety of the trial court’s order striking out from the records Rizalina Lamzon’s testimony. It held that since the failure of petitioner
to present its witness is due to its fault, such incomplete testimony cannot be
taken into account by the trial court.
On the alleged partiality of the trial
court, the Court of Appeals dismissed said allegation there being no evidence
on record to establish the same.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the above Decision.
The Court of Appeals did not budge from its stand denying the motion in
a Resolution dated
Hence, the instant Petition.
Petitioner claims that the arbitrary
acts of the trial court resulted in the denial of its right to due process, and
that the Courts of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders.
As earlier mentioned, petitioner attributes
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying its motion
to reset the cross-examination of its witness Rizalina
Lamzon, in not resolving the Motion for Reconsideration
thereof, and in decreeing the striking out of the testimony of Rizalina Lamzon.
In a zealous effort to justify the
non-appearance of witness Rizalina Lamzon during the
Petitioner’s contention that it was
denied due process is not well-taken.
The most basic tenet of due process
is the right to be heard.[19] Where a party had been afforded an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot
complain of deprivation of due process.[20] Due process is satisfied as long as the party
is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If
it is not availed of, it is deemed forfeited without violating the Bill of
Rights.[21]
As borne by the records, the subject
Urgent Motion to Transfer Dates of Hearing/Trial was not the first motion for
resetting ever filed or made by the counsel for petitioner. On
The case has been pending for more
than four years and had endured during that period more than the usually
acceptable number of continuances. The presentation of Rizalina
Lamzon in the witness stand alone has been dragging
on for quite some time since her scheduled appearance on
As early as
As to petitioner’s justification that
its witness was engrossed in the preparation for her case in the
Moreover, the grant of a motion for
continuance or postponement is not a matter of right.[26] It is addressed to the sound discretion of
the courts. Parties asking for postponement have no right to assume that their
motions would be granted nor to expect that their
motion for reconsideration of their denied motion for postponement would be
reconsidered.[27] Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the
hearing.[28] Action
thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and
manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice.[29]
In other words, this Court cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion
simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather than
postpone the hearing to another day because of the absence of a party or a
party’s witness.[30] To constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to
postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness
which is totally absent in the case under consideration.
As to the contested order of striking
out the unfinished testimony of Rizalina Lamzon, the trial court’s action cannot be labelled as arbitrary or oppressive. This order was but a plausible outcome of the
previous order denying petitioner’s motion for postponement. With such denial, the proper procedure was to declare the
presentation of evidence of the petitioner terminated.[31]
In Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines,[32]
the trial court’s denial of respondent’s motion for postponement and its order
striking out the testimony of respondent’s witness were assailed as having been
issued in grave abuse of discretion. Respondent therein advanced an excuse that
its witnesses who had to come from
Under the circumstances, the excuse given by defendant
that the witnesses could not leave their respective stations and places of work
to attend the trial is plainly unacceptable.
There was enough time and opportunity for defendant to have made the
corresponding adjustments in the assignments of its personnel so as to enable
its witnesses to be in court. The
trouble is that defendant relied on the assumption that the court could be made
to wait until the volume and other conditions of its business would permit it
to comply with the schedule of the court x x x.[33]
The Court therein emphasized:
Coming now to the second assigned error regarding the
striking out of the unfinished testimony of Lazarri,
the Court is also of the opinion and so holds that the trial court’s action
cannot be categorized as arbitrary or oppressive or as amounting to a grave
abuse of discretion. To be sure, this second order was but a logical
consequence of the previous order denying defendant’s motion for postponement.
With such denial, the next thing in order was to declare the presentation of
evidence of the defendant terminated x x x.[34]
Also, in Union Motor Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[35]
petitioner therein alleged that the trial court committed a violation of due
process when it ordered the striking off the testimony of petitioner’s lone
witness. The Court did not succumb to the plaint of petitioner and ruled that
the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
striking from the records the incomplete testimony of the witness. Assenting to
the trial court’s finding, the Court articulated:
To place the blame on the respondent spouses is to put
a premium on the negligence of the petitioner to require its own witness to
testify on cross-examination. By presenting witness Balones
on direct-examination, the petitioner had the corresponding duty to make him
available for cross-examination in accordance with fair play and due process.
The respondents should not be prejudiced by the repeated failure of the
petitioner to present its said witness for cross-examination. Hence, the trial
court ordered that the unfinished testimony of said witness be stricken off the
record.[36]
Likewise, in Cuñada v. Drilon,[37]
the trial court’s order striking off the records a witness’ testimony was
assailed to have violated due process. Brushing aside such allegation, the
Court said:
Petitioner Victor Cuñada had
the duty to complete his testimony and make himself
available for cross examination in accordance with fair play and due process.
As his oral testimony remained incomplete, the same could not be the subject of
cross-examination. It was therefore rendered incompetent and inadmissible in
evidence and as such properly stricken off.
x x x x
x x x
Far from being denied the right to be heard, petitioners were given the
opportunity to present their evidence but they squandered the opportunity as
they failed to complete their evidence x x x.
Given the facts obtaining in the
instant case and taking into consideration the applicable jurisprudence just
discussed, this Court is of the considered view that the Court of Appeals did
not err in finding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial
court in denying petitioner’s motion for postponement and in striking off the
records Rizalina Lamzon’s
testimony.
One final point.
It is contended that the trial court was partial in favor of the
respondent. The Court laboriously mulled
over the records of the case and found nothing to substantiate such allegation.
WHEREFORE, the
Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino, with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 60-69.
[2] Rollo, p. 71.
[3] Annex “E”; Rollo, p. 109.
[4] Annex “F”;
[5] Annex “H”;
[6] Records, Vol. II, p. 661.
[7] Records, Vol. III, pp. 125-126.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] CA rollo, p. 304.
[18] Rollo, p. 67.
[19] Tiomico v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 558, 570 (1999).
[20]
[21]
[22] Records, Vol. III, p. 90.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
157219,
[27]
[28] Gochan v. Gochan, 446 Phil. 433, 454 (2003).
[29]
[30] Supra note 26.
[31] Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines, G.R. No. L-28773,
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] 414 Phil. 33 (2001).
[36]
[37] G.R. No. 159118,